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THE DIALECTIC AND THE PRINCIPLE OF CONTRADICTION.*

Translated from the German of Dr. C. L. MICHELET by LOUIS SOLDAN.

When Hegel condescended on one occasion to defend himself against some quite inferior attacks, to wit, of Catholic priests and other persons, this hero of science compared himself to the hero of war of the Prussian state, Frederic II., who said to one of his generals after the battle of Kunnersdorf: "Just see, with such a rabble I have to scuffle!" It was not given to Hegel to have an opponent of equal rank to contend with, such as Plato found in Aristotle or Fichte in Schelling. The feet of those who were to carry him out, failed to come. Under the cross-fire of the pigmies which creep up to him, he stands unhurt and unshaken, like a rock in the roaring sea. And neither the public reputation of the one, nor the obscurity of the other—both internally worthless—nor least of all the potent disfavor of the governing class, could shake his fame, though the latter may have helped very much to confine to narrower limits for a time the appreciation of this hero, and even the effectiveness of his labors, by patronizing his adversaries.

Herr v. Hartmann has "never come into personal contact with any teacher of philosophy" (Pref. p. iii). Nevertheless he ventures, "far from the strife of philosophical schools," upon a very detailed critique of the Hegelian Dialectic, and is not afraid merely to repeat what has been said before, though other opponents—Trendelenburg to begin with—spring forth by scores like mushrooms. Because they have not yet sufficiently killed the common enemy—as it certainly appears to the author—he feels himself the man to enter the lists again, to break again a lance, and as a brave champion to make an end with "the giddy sham that was to rise over Kant's tomb" (p. 23). If others, as Mr. Bergmann for instance, repeating merely Trendelenburg's assertion, call the philosophical systems after Kant an "intoxication," it may be said that the expression "giddy" is no very original one, inasmuch as giddi-

* A critique on the publication, "On the Dialectic Method. Historical-Critical Inquiries. By E. v. Hartmann. Berlin, 1868. Published by Carl Duncker."

ness is commonly the first natural consequence of intoxication. But although our author does not feel giddy at the apprehension "that the present undertaking might appear presuming," yet he wishes to "call to mind that there is no other piety toward the heroes of science" than to "examine their productions more carefully than anybody else's" (p. v). Whereupon we have only to remark that if but one fourth of what Hegel is reproached with be true—if indeed Mr. Hartmann could with good reason point out in the Dialectic "crack-brained statements" (pp. 52-54), "sophisms" (pp. 71, 75), "tricks" (p. 79), "hushing of facts" (pp. 80-81),—then Hegel would not be the hero at all, whom even his assailant (his most embittered animosities notwithstanding) wishes and is obliged to acknowledge him to be. By this, of course, the "piety" displayed before, comes down to the level of a mere conversational phrase. Still it must be acknowledged that Mr. Hartmann does not ignore altogether the dialectic method as others have done in their attacks, but magnanimously stoops to an ample refutation of it.

In this attempt, the confession of Weisse—himself an opponent of Hegel—that "Hegel's only achievement" is "the invention of the true method," proves very offensive to our author (p. iii). For, if this were the case, the calamity, so deplorable to our author, will happen that "all attacks against the Hegelian philosophy and logic are lost for the critic of the dialectic method," and consequently even his own book would have to find its way into the waste-basket. "For it might well be that this instrument is still at this moment waiting for the artist who will make the proper use of it." To keep off such a horror, Herr v. Hartmann declines to follow Weisse (who rejected only the results of Hegel's Dialectic) in taking hold of the nag by the tail. He undertakes, on the contrary, to seize the bull by its horns in "assigning to the results of Hegel's philosophy (aside from the method by which they have been gained) a necessary place in the development of philosophy. *Principiis obsta* is his motto. Yet no! at p. 119 Mr. Hartmann changes his mind, and will allow that necessary place not only to the principal results of Hegelian philosophy, but also to its "fundamental principles." What a contradiction! as the fundamental principles

can be nothing else than the method, the way of gaining the results.

The whole of the present book is divided into two parts, one historical (pp. 1-34) and the other polemical (pp. 35-124), which we will now pass under review.

I.

In the first part, the author's attempts are designed to tear Hegel out from the connection of the history of philosophy—to isolate him. Of course; for if "Hegel's assertion, that by his method merely the form of exact science and perfection was given to that which the majority of great philosophers attempted before with more or less consciousness," happened to be true, our author's whole enterprise would again fall to the ground. For he himself seems not to be equal to the Herculean task of impeaching the entire gallery of heroes of science with tolerable swindling or underhand tricks. And so he endeavors merely to show in this most concise outline of the history of philosophy, which manifests an uncommonly deficient knowledge of it, and particularly great ignorance of its original, that Hegel's predecessors were driving with their Dialectic at quite a different thing from what Hegel purposed with his. Even when he is not able to efface the quite obvious close relation between Hegel and three or four other philosophers, i. e. Heraklitus, Plato, Proklus, and Nicolas Cusanus: he nevertheless tries now this shift, and then some other, to separate Hegel also from these. Let us briefly go over the four.

Heraklitus, says our author, "considers the process as the principal thing." Very true! Of this principle, Mr. Hartmann will admit only that "every change is a transition of one condition or state into its opposite"; but agrees with Aristotle's objection, that "Heraklitus violated the principle of contradiction when he asserted that everything has always the opposite in it, and that everything *is* and is not at the same time"; and thinks most wisely, squinting and hinting at Hegel, that "the outgrowths of this abortion do not offer any support to the products of our century which require the highest mental maturity." Now here only the length of time is represented to separate Heraklitus and Hegel, as the con-

tents will by no means allow of such a separation. But with this Mr. Hartmann has laid bare the very centre of his battery of attack against Hegel. For he is ready to admit that antitheses change into each other, but not that one is contained in the other, because this would exclude the principle of contradiction. As if antitheses could pass into each other without being developed from each other. As if not also the identity of antitheses expressed in this could preserve their difference, and thus not at all conflict with the principle of contradiction. Mr. Hartmann, as it appears, is a great deal bolder than even Mr. Bergmann, who allots to German philosophy the prodigious task of denying that the understanding is governed by logical laws; or what with Mr. Bergmann manifests itself only as a suspicion, has become a certainty with Mr. Hartmann.

Even where the author must admit that Heraklitus is completely a dialectician in the Hegelian sense, he grudges Hegel's agreement with Plato, and wants therefore to distinguish essentially Plato's dialectic from Hegel's both in substance and language. "Plato denies," it says on p. 8, "that an idea might by itself pass into another, or that it might contain antitheses at the same time and in the same relation. Now it is but these latter two points that separate Hegel's Dialectic from sound common sense." Against this pert assertion stands however, according to the author's own confession, at least *one* passage in Plato over which he wishes to get by the following turn: Hegel, to identify his dialectic with Plato's, "rests on a single obscure and disputed passage of the Sophist, which, in whatever way you may construe it grammatically, will at any rate exclude the Hegelian interpretation" (Soph. p. 259). It is incredible that after my correspondence with the author on this passage, it should still appear to him obscure and doubtful, which it never has been nor can be to any one possessing even but a fair knowledge of Greek. I therefore decline to show him also in its proper light the former passage of the Sophist, about which he seems to ask also my opinion in his last letter; and merely say that it does not depend upon one passage in Plato, but upon his whole dialectic in connection, to furnish the sun-clear proof that Plato "pronounces to be the true dialectic" the same which Hegel has in mind.

According to Plato, Dialectic is no longer, as with Heraklitus, the Process of the sensuous things, but of the Ideas in and for themselves. And as the ideas are themselves the divine, they—or the idea (λόγος)—intermingle and pass through each other (δι' αὐτῶν εἰς αὐτά), they are also in the same respect the One in which they are the other (ὅταν τις φῇ ταῦτόν ὄν ἕτερον ἐκείνη καὶ κατ' ἐκείνο ὃ φησι τούτων πεπονθέναι πότερον). Thus, for instance, the One is the infinite Many because each is ONE; and for this reason has two parts, BEING and ONE; each part again has two others, and so on *ad infinitum*. But inasmuch as One is *One*, it has conversely not many parts, because in this case it would be *Many* and not *One*; and as infinitely small, it is Nothing. Thus the One is in the same respect One and Many, Nothing and the Infinite. At the same time the two are not in the same way (ὁμοίως) identical. For Being and Nothing, One and Many, form also an absolute antithesis. In this way Plato does not sin against the principle of contradiction and just as little does Hegel, as they do justice both to the antithesis and to the unity. But the unity would however be outflanked by the antithesis in case we held asunder the antitheses in such a manner as to predicate them of One thing only in some way or other (ἀμῇ γέ πῃ): as in calling Six great against Four and small against Eight; or Socrates one of Seven, but Many by his parts. This is what Plato and Hegel term prating and the work of a tyro, while the author (p. 62) pronounces this very thing true dialectic. In the application of the ideas to sensuous things the separation and final disjunction of opposites takes place, while in their state of pure being-in-itself they change into each other. Yet wherever in the sphere of the Finite the Infinite as a resemblance to the ideas is bursting through, there will also exist an intermingling of ideas: so nature is Becoming, Life, Activity, because Being and Non-being are united in her inseparably; so music, virtue, are harmony and beauty, because in them the Definite and the Indefinite (ἄπειρον and πέρας) blend. These are Plato's own words, taken faithfully from the Parmenides, Sophist, Philebus, and other dialogues. And the thorough knowledge of the Platonic dialectic depends neither upon the interpreting ingenuity of a model professor of philology nor the impotency of an amateur-bungler. Thus even Mr. Hart-

mann does not wish to deny the possibility "that already Plato had before his mind as a distant ideal the identification of opposites in the Hegelian sense" (p. 7). This is perfectly sufficient for us, and we reject most emphatically in Plato's name the ignoble motive of indolence imputed to him.

To alienate Proklus from Hegel, and to counterpoise the undeniable development of the world out of the conception of the $\epsilon\nu$ in Proklus, Zeller is called to aid, "who himself arisen from the Hegelian school, deserted it in later times." This incident, instead of serving his purpose, should have been the very thing to put Mr. Hartmann on his guard against Zeller. Zeller accuses Proklus of scholasticism, and "sterile and monotonous formalism" (p. 12). Whereby it is only astonishing, as the same reproach has been made against Hegel, that Mr. Hartmann has not seen even in this a sort of a resemblance between Proklus and Hegel. So greatly Mr. Hartmann mistakes the advantage offered to him by Mr. Zeller's weapons and those of other predecessors; but he does not want to see similarity at any rate, because he is bent upon setting Proklus and Hegel at variance.

On Nicolas Cusanus' views, whom Hegel strangely enough appears not to have known, he says on p. 17: "If this doctrine has in its discrimination between *reason* and *intellect*, and the principle of the *coincidentia contrariorum*, the greatest similarity to Hegel, it is still essentially distinguished from it both by the highest stage placed above the intellect and by the impotent infinite process of ascent": which two deviations do not lessen at all the similarity of the dialectic of the two.

Then Mr. Hartmann finds a still greater resemblance to Hegel in GIORDANO BRUNO (p. 18), inasmuch as the latter set forth with special emphasis, that only in God himself all antitheses are at the same time and without any difference of time united; that, on the contrary, in all worldly things perfection consisted only in this, that each and every thing can and must in the course of time become each and everything else. Bruno has also pronounced as "the peculiar and deepest secret of art" to "develop from the point of union also its antithesis." It is very droll, of course, how there should still exist "the enormous difference between the two," that, with Bruno, the *philosopher* has to develop the idea out of its an-

tithesis, but with Hegel the idea *itself*." To which we have only to reply, that the philosopher would act very wrongly if he performed this development when the idea refused to do it itself. By the way of consolation, we may assure Mr. Hartmann that in this the philosopher and the idea go hand in hand; that the idea is but the personified philosopher. And thus in his "short description of the dialectic method" he himself paints it quite correctly in this way: The self-movement of the idea is just as much the objective course of the thing itself as it is the thinking process in the philosopher's head" (p. 37).

The exposition, finally, of the philosophical systems of Kant, Fichte, and Schelling, as being perfectly separated from the Hegelian dialectic, bears moreover testimony of the greatest ignorance of this part also of the history of philosophy, as everybody who has lived through it, or has restored it to new life within himself by study, will have seen also before his very eyes the gradual growth of the Hegelian dialectic from those stand-points. By which, of course, we do not mean to deny that Hegel added to it the keystone of perfection by his own efforts—the essential point which our author either would not or could not appreciate. We will ask him, however, if he is unable to find "something of Hegel's dialectic principles" in Kant's assertion, that the first two categories of each class—thus, for instance, Reality and Negation—are the opposites united in the third category, Limitation?

While Kant presents the result of this dialectic as an assertion merely without attempting to deduce it, Fichte undertakes this, as the author states it himself by quoting Fichte's words, as follows (p. 25): "We must ask ourselves, how can A and —A, Being and Non-being, Reality and Negation, be thought together without annihilating and cancelling each other?" Fichte finding the solution, like Kant, in the idea of Limitation, has almost given Hegel his cue, who says, in the same way, that, in the Becoming, Being and Non-being are both preserved (i. e. *not* annihilated) and cancelled. Neither of these philosophers, however, thinks that he has cancelled by this the principle of contradiction. Mr. Hartmann alone sees this in it, but he charges only Hegel with it (p. 78). * *

* * * * * But while Mr. Hartmann pretends to see in Fichte only sober and healthy understanding, and no superabundance of reason, he should have been more considerate in lavishing praise on him at Hegel's expense, as the author seems to agree with Herbart's opinion, who throws Fichte very much in the same category with his successors;—this should also have made Mr. Bergmann more considerate before giving himself over to the extravagancies of the intellectual intuition. Herbart's words are these: "Fichte retained the unthinkable (*undenkbaren*) thought; he gave it authority by the assumption of an intellectual intuition: and thus one of the greatest thinkers that ever existed became the originator of a visionary movement which thereafter, when it chose for its central-point the so-called absolute identity, banished philosophy from a wide circle, because one did not want to lose one's reason about the intellectual intuition." Such classical sobriety Hegel's two opposers, to which we have referred hitherto, ought to have taken for an example!

At the close of this part Mr. Hartmann wants to absolve also Schelling, the originator of the absolute identity, from any community with Hegel, in saying: "When he speaks of the identity of opposites, it is only a misuse of the word; for he does not at all mean by it Oneness or Sameness, but organic unity" (pp. 29–30). Now this is the very thing that Hegel means too. And the author is *naïve* enough to admit this in part: "Hegel however uses, as we shall see, the word Identity sometimes in Schelling's, sometimes in its proper (Aristotelian) meaning, producing thereby unlimited confusion." Is it possible to speak more unreasonably about this modern Aristotle? And does the "unlimited confusion" not lie rather in Mr. Hartmann's brain? As in the original system Schelling's identity of the Infinite and the Finite, the Universal and the Particular, the Essence and the Form, the Ideal and the Real, conveyed too undeniably the fusion of the opposites, Mr. Hartmann contents himself with attempting to demonstrate the contradistinction between Schelling and Hegel by the polemic of New-Schellingism against the dialectic method; which, of course, is not a too difficult undertaking

after all, and affords an extremely easy triumph. "So far," he exclaims pathetically, "was the only contemporary who was Hegel's peer from allowing himself to be dazzled by his dialectic" (p. 31). But it is a mistake of Mr. Hartmann's to place this polemic of Schelling in his early period, as the editor of Schelling's works places it expressly in the year 1827, in the München period (Schelling's Works I. 10, p. vi); whereas Schelling himself, in the essay from which this polemic is taken, already calls Hegel's Philosophy an episode, and even the difference between positive and negative philosophy is mentioned (p. 126). Nevertheless it is highly characteristic that Mr. Hartmann will read from even the very latest words of Schelling that the latter was ashamed of having become unfaithful to the old prejudice of absolute science, and of having arrived at the better knowledge that it was possible, only by following an inductive procedure, to learn anything to which there is a content. Thus was still clinging to Hegel this "only contemporary who was Hegel's peer," whom Mr. Hartmann is bent so eagerly on separating from him.

II.

The second and greater part of the treatise is devoted almost exclusively to the "critique of the Dialectic Method."

To define his "position to the dialectic method" Mr. Hartmann begins his critique by a critique of my critique on Trendelenburg in the "*Gedanke*." Mr. Trendelenburg had said that Hegel infers, according to the second Aristotelian figure, "Being is the Indeterminate, Nought is the Indeterminate; therefore Being is Nought": as if a man and a goose were the same because both have two legs. I had replied to this, that both conceptions have other predicates in common besides, as simplicity, immediateness, pure abstraction. In the same respect therefore in which Being is, for instance, the purest abstraction, it is also nought—that is, on account of its want of content. But as, according to the principle of contradiction, Being is simply opposite to Nought, this Identity is to be conceived as transition in the Becoming. Such a changing of opposites into each other, even Mr. Hartmann finds unobjectionable (p. 7). Why, then, does he blame the Hegelian Dialectic for the same thing? When he puts to the latter the alternative that the Identity of Being and Nought

must be either a partial or a total one (pp. 39–40), I answer: then it is partial when these categories rest outside of each other, because they then fall, as opposites, outside of each other.

In the Becoming, however, the Identity of the opposite has become a total one, because they form there the inseparable Moments of a new idea. These are facts of our thinking, and I do not know how Mr. Hartmann will manage to get round them.

The monstrous delusion and error of the author consists in thinking that Hegel, in maintaining the existence of contradiction—nay, in declaring all things contradictory for themselves—has negated the principle of contradiction, while by this very doctrine he acknowledged it. Not he contradicts himself who admits the existence of contradictions, but he who asserts what is contradictory. We shall see presently, however, that Mr. Hartmann's book everywhere swarms with contradictions. Though this circumstance would make it impossible according to Mr. Hartmann's opinion (p. 31), our judgment nevertheless shall not preclude the book from existence. Just in the same way history abounds with contradictions; still it exists—nay, for this reason it progresses. For contradiction is not Nought, an impossibility, but rather the source of motion, by which the former negates itself, even if by this a new difficulty is created. So it is indeed a misunderstanding when Mr. Hartmann charges that "the negation of the principle of contradiction is the *conditio sine qua non* for the existence of the Dialectic" (p. 41). To identify contradictories (horse and non-horse) is to negate the principle of contradiction: this Hegel never does; he only identifies contraries, as in Grey, Black and White, or Light and Darkness in Color. An atom of salt is to us base and acid in inseparable union, against which the Understanding sure enough says that atoms of base and of acid are only side by side in the salt. But as we see the opposites in One and still do not at all call it a contradiction, this Mr. Hartmann terms "the Dialectic is caught in its own net" (p. 43); and yet he knows the difference between contrary and contradictory very well, and knows also that we make the distinction too. Such contradiction lives in himself.

Since from this one misunderstanding, as from an arsenal, Mr. Hartmann's whole apparatus of arms of attack is taken, I might be content with this and save myself reiteration. In this Mr. Hartmann confirms me himself when he is *naïve* enough to admit that one can never detect the genuine dialectician in an *absurdity*; but that with the non-dialectic critic it will be as with one hunting spectres (pp. 43-44).—Therefore I shall have to mention of such a critique only what besides this will perhaps be found prominent in the way of unusual solecisms. For it is, properly speaking, “to be considered inconsequent in a dialectician if he engages in the refutation of such attacks from his opponent (p. 44). Yes, indeed! Besides, I have already communicated to the author, in writing, all my objections against his whole manuscript *ad marginem*. All warnings, however, remained without the slightest effect; he prints the entire trash, even that the dialectic must necessarily, by negating the principle of contradiction, become dangerous to mathematics and to—criminal law (p. 92), and the other absurdities of this and the following page, which I skip in order to make the reader curious to read them. Even Kuno Fischer's quite correct explanation, that “the question was not about the identity of contradictories, but about the Oneness of the opposites in the dialectic development” (p. 109), could not bring Mr. Hartmann to the right track. It applies, therefore, to other people than those at whom Mr. Hartmann has aimed it, “that contradiction can only be found where one has fallen into it before” (pp. 94-95). Now he has, before the eyes of the public at large, to stand the reproof which I first sent him in a confidential letter.

The next point to which I wish to call special attention is, that Mr. Hartmann says: “the essential task of the critic of the dialectic method is to exhibit the consequences of the negation of the principle of contradiction” (p. 45). But as we do not at all negate the principle of contradiction, nothing material remains, but something quite immaterial; hence spectres in very truth, which he is hunting also in the remaining part of his publication, up to the very end, faithfully and indefatigably. Mr. Bergmann was at least looking for an intermediate position between common logic and speculative

dialectic. Mr. Hartmann remains resolutely aground on the secure sands of the former.

Where the author afterwards comes to a refutation of the Hegelian idea of Infinity, we read the following: "Any idea can receive the predicate infinite only in so far as it has a quantitative side" (p. 49); "but for Hegel there *is* no quantitative infinity at all in the true sense of the word" (p. 48). But two pages before, it is: The infinitely great is an impossible idea, because it represents the Infinite as really existing, and therefore has in itself the contradiction of an infinity given as finished. That there is no quantitative infinity, for which Hegel is reproved two pages after, the author here avers to be true; to him, therefore, the False is the True—and this he does not call negation of the principle of contradiction. Hegel, he further thinks, knows only qualitative infinities; and, to refute these, Mr. Hartmann adds that it would be all nonsense to say "infinitely bare-footed" (pp. 48–49). Does, perchance, the expression "infinitely silly" suit him better? As far as we know, the infinity with Hegel comes in but with the negation of limit, i. e. of the one-sided qualitative, therefore with the totality and ideality of the qualities. While the author attributes "Indeterminateness" to Hegel's Infinity, this infinity is just the opposite of indeterminateness, as it is the self-determining. One who thus kicks at random at a noble philosophy should first learn the facts before he dares to criticise what he neither understands, nor seems able ever to learn to understand. But so much the principle of contradiction with our author commences to totter, that he says in the same breath the opposite from what he has said about the indeterminateness in Hegel: "that the idea precipitates into another determinateness, NOT INTO THE NEGATIVE INDETERMINATE; that it preserves in each determinateness its indeterminateness, this is even the qualitative infinitude of Hegel." (p. 50.)

When Mr. Hartmann asserts that nobody before Hegel, except Nicolas Cusanus, has placed in antagonism understanding and reason, I refer to Kant, to Jacobi in his later writings, to Plato's *διδονοια* and *ἐπιστήμη* or *νοῦς*, to Aristotle's *ἐπιστήμη ἀποδεικτική* in oppositon to *νοῦς* or *νόησις*. This is the way in which Mr. Hartmann knows the history of philosophy! In

this way he forgets the lamentations which he has uttered himself that Kant distinguishes between understanding and reason. If Mr. Hartmann wonders that "reason is known to so few" (p. 55), it remained but with him to increase this number instead of siding with the unreasoning multitude.

The few who ever knew, for knowledge's sake
Have ended on the cross and on the stake.

If he furthermore wonders that the majority of men, though they live, act, and are in it, and should necessarily be wholly pervaded by it, still deny its existence; he ought to have remembered the word of the other of these Dioscuri of poetry, that Truth walks ghostlike through the unknowing multitude, which does not even suspect her presence. The very thing which, according to Hegel, as the author mentions, "constitutes man's nature, REASON, is but scantily represented in the great majority"; and, to use an expression of mine, mentioned by the author, is seized upon only by the "favorites of the gods," because among mankind, as again Schiller says, the greater part are "blanks," and only a few, "prizes."

The Indeterminateness of the Infinite—so often and falsely imputed to Hegel by the author, which he also terms the "absolute fluidity of the idea"—Mr. Hartmann wants to explain on one side in stating that by this Indeterminateness it appears less repulsive to think the unity of contradiction—nay, that in the pure indeterminateness every contradiction had to vanish, so to say; on the other side, he directly denies this Indeterminateness, as in the absolute, on the contrary, "contradiction is preserved in its entire antithesis." Consequently, making the Indeterminateness (in which every contradiction disappears) the principle, means rather to make this Indeterminateness not the principle, as the antitheses are to be preserved. We await anxiously from the author a solution of this absolute contradiction. But even now it appears, from several examples quoted above, that not Hegel but Mr. Hartmann is guilty of negating the principle of contradiction, though in the most innocent way in the world, as he has not the least idea of the reach of his accusations. That Hegel allows the contradiction to exist, and in the absolute Indeterminate, posits and engulfs the totality of all things

existing (p. 76), is again one of those spectres which Mr. Hartmann is hunting. This contradiction, as we have seen above, is solved in the principle of self-determination, inasmuch as all the instances of ideal determinateness (*Bestimmtheiten*) are therein posited as the moments of the absolute.

As to the *legitimation of the method* (p. 66), the author imputes to it that it draws its justification out of itself, being unable to justify itself before the understanding (p. 67). We ask whether it is possible to justify one of the antitheses before the tribunal of the other. The one, of course, rejects the other, and will certainly not yield and be fused into it. That Unity arises from opposites, and the latter from the former, can be justified itself only from a consideration of the case itself. The process of things, like that of thoughts, must be traced and has been traced in experience. This internal rhythmus of the thing itself, which the philosopher is called to witness without influencing it (p. 37), is consummated by itself in the dialectic of the world, as Schelling calls it, as well as in science. And in this very fact lies the confidence of the dialectic method of being this science which is its own proof. Each criterion adduced from outside would make it dependent: the criterion would have to be proven again, and so on *ad infinitum*; the proof would hang in the air unsupported. Yet *veritas est index sui et falsi*.

From the chapter on *The Contradiction*, which intends to show how Hegel exhibits the contradiction in all and everything, we have stated before, the principal among the supposed tricks of dialectic and considered the same. There are only a few "tricks of the meaner order" left of which Mr. Hartmann accuses the dialectic method (p. 79). I will not deny that the dialectic by which Hegel makes Equality and Inequality pass over into each other (Works, IV., pp. 42-43) is an impure one like that with which Hegel reproaches Plato in the passage in Parmenides where One changes into Many. But to reproach Hegel with an "artificial confusion" is as little justified as if Mr. Hartmann had reproached Plato with it, if he had known that passage. I, for one, should have given the dialectic of Equality and Inequality in this way: We cannot at all posit two things as equal which are not unequal at the same time, as they would otherwise not be Two,

but only One. And Similarity is just the idea in which Equality and Inequality while perfect antitheses, yet are simply one. If this assertion negated the principle of contradiction, the fault would lie with the idea of similarity itself; we would wash our hands of it. In mathematics, of course, Equality and Similarity are separate, inasmuch as two equal triangles, as ideal things, are in fact but one; similar ones, however, two.

It is furthermore counted against Hegel as a sophism to assert, "because A and B are different that A has therefore the difference on itself" (p. 84); the sophism appears to be rather in the assertion, that the difference is not an attribute of A itself. For the difference, according to Mr. Hartmann, is only "to express the relation in which both are considered by the thinking process. The relation hovers between the two as a thing added from outside" (pp. 83-84). The amount of it is that ideas do not contain in themselves what the philosopher thinks about them—a monstrous sophism, if the thoughts were correct. So the dialectic method unmercifully has our critic "on the hip," and pushes him back into the snare which he has laid for others. He accuses Hegel with ascribing difference to Identity because it is different from difference, while this is an expression very common to Plato: which is further testimony against the author's above-mentioned efforts to separate Plato's and Hegel's Dialectics.

Opposites which demand each other, as cause and effect, the author further says, presuppose each other as separate, even if they cannot be separated in the thinking process, while the dialectic gives rise to the misrepresenting appearance as if each side contained or possessed its own contrast; which would, of course, be a contradiction (p. 85). But inasmuch as cause is only cause by having an effect, and this effect will not appear if it does not react against the cause—(Boreas may well break an oak but not a reed, because only the one and not the other offers resistance);—therefore the effect is only possible by the reaction, i. e. the cause is the effect of its own effect, the effect the cause of its own cause. Are here "the ideas of cause and effect inseparable only in the thinking process," or are they not rather so in reality too? Will not the author reconcile himself, as he styles it,

to think the contradiction? Or does he rather choose not to think the causality? The same quantity of motion is in the impelling hand-cause, in the impelled object-effect. Is quantity for this reason a contradiction? Here, too, the author opines (p. 86) that the contents of cause and effect are not identical. Yet the quantity of motion is identical in both, and solely in reference to this they are cause and effect. They are not at all cause and effect in what they are besides, flesh, wood, &c. In reciprocal action, where the identity of cause and effect exhibits itself still more plainly and lies in the very words, and therefore cannot be ignored, Mr. Hartmann finds consolation in the statement that Schopenhauer "has done away with this monstrous category forever" (!?). But what is the use of this doing away, if the Reaction to which the author gives an undeserved preference is not also thrown overboard?

Finally, it is stated that Hegel, in his view of the logical judgment, has committed the terrible offence, made the dreadful "confusion" (p. 88), of mistaking Unity and Identity (p. 86), for the purpose of being able to discover in each judgment a contradiction between its general form and its content (p. 89). Into the idea of Unity the idea of Identity is introduced, and from this point of view the copula is construed into a sign of identity between the several parts of the sentence (p. 90). Here we find again a whole nest of contradictions in the author's attacks, while he believes that he perceives them on the other side. The "*is*" of the copula is no doubt the sign of mathematical equality, as in every logic the form of judgment is $E = A$ or $S = P$. Now Hegel says nothing else but this: "That the form of the judgment expresses what the content does not mean at all." Hegel does not at all assert that subject and predicate are the same, or, as the author says, that "they become united to unity without contradiction" (p. 88). Then only, if Hegel had really made this assertion, he would have committed the contradiction which Mr. Hartmann wishes to see avoided. For what is One, is not Two; therefore quite coinciding. It is therefore again Mr. Hartmann who mistakes Unity and Identity. For Identity means exactly the combination of two which are different at the same time. Hegel only knows of the Identity of different

ones and of the difference of identical ones. What he means to say is therefore this: that even the quite shallow logical form of a judgment cannot kill wholly the speculative thought, the form bearing in itself the identity to which the difference of contents between subject and predicate does not correspond. This non-corresponding is equalized more and more in the higher forms of judgment, the predicate expressing in the categorical judgment the genus of the subject, in the assertorical one its idea, though, for all that, the difference will not wholly disappear.

If Mr. Hartmann thinks that Hegel is wronging Empiricism by accusing it of denying the supersensuous and freedom (pp. 71, 100), he ought to have consulted history, which would have shown him that these were indeed the consequences of Empiricism, as Locke was succeeded by Condillac, the French materialism of the 18th, and the German materialism of the 19th century. If, nevertheless, empiricism has produced in Mr. Trendelenburg, for instance, not materialism but "happiness in believing," this must be accounted for as inconsequence and not as consequence in this empiric. Otherwise belief were to be considered as experience; which has been done heretofore by mystics, but never by philosophers. For the attempted proof that Hegel's Dialectic and its "absolute" arose from a sensuous mysticism is such a magnificent piece of Hartmann-like deduction, that I cannot help referring the reader to it for his amusement. (pp. 63-64, 71-72, 77, 120.) Mr. Hartmann goes a good deal farther than Mr. Bergmann: "Experience is the only possible way to come to a content; for mystic conception is an individual rarity" (p. 111). Mr. Bergmann's intellectual intuition, which derives sensuousness from the thought, will probably be pronounced by Mr. Hartmann a fantastic conceit. If Mr. Hartmann has not yet caught the relation of dialectic and empiricism, even after the rebuke to which I subjected Mr. Trendelenburg in the "*Gedanke*," if he still sees in their unity nothing but *wind*, to use his own rather easy expression (pp. 113-15), he again stirred this wind himself, forgetful of the principle of contradiction. For, to refute my arguments, he says: "Michelet forgets that empiricism includes thought." Consequently, Mr. Hartmann admits the very thing about which we care,

and which he has imputed to us, and which we consequently cannot have forgotten. For if empiricism includes thinking, it is *one* with it. Thinking, I stated before to Mr. Bergmann, is in itself experience: and thoughtless empiricism is not a thing belonging to us, or with which we should like to deal.

Fancying to have thoroughly and fully refuted in the preceding pages the dialectic method, the author finally proposes the question: "how Hegel happened to strike upon his method" (p. 117). Here the author falls into an entirely unworthy contradiction. After having stated quite correctly the absolute origin of the method from the character of the thing, he undertakes to trace back this necessity to merely contingent circumstances. In the first respect, he says: "It seems that an *a priori* reproduction of the world's process must be possible before the individual consciousness," yet "it might bear little resemblance with the temporal genesis of the world"; but which "can only strengthen the hope for success, as the question is now about an eternal genesis—a process of thought which is the course of the thing itself. Thus on the whole the dialectic method arises from the principle of the Hegelian system, *which is not to be criticised here*. And here the method exhibits itself, mark well, in its pure shape" (p. 118). Very well! To the pure all things are pure. It is a pity that the author falls immediately afterwards into the very impure stupidity of the understanding, of representing the historic genesis of the system, in which indeed the Necessary enters under the appearance of Chance, as a mere disease of fashion: by this it becomes evident that his pretended unwillingness to criticise is mere irony. For if the author, after endeavoring in his historical part to dispute away the genesis of the Hegelian stand-point from the necessary evolution of the history of philosophy in our century, is pricked too deeply by his historical conscience; he has no choice but to transmute historical necessity into historical incident, and to denounce it as mere fashion:—"It was fashion to attribute to Kant's Antinomies an excessive, even a positive, value. It was fashion since Fichte to consider the so-called deduction of categories as the main subject of theoretical philosophy. It was fashion to philosophize in the triadic rhythm of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. It was fashion

to misunderstand Schelling's transcendental intuition; to pass off philosophy in a pompous manner for the science of the absolute, and so forth. What a straining of history to denounce just the fundamental points of Hegel's three predecessors as 'external incidents,' merely to saw off from Hegel 'the pillars to his method'!" (p. 119.)

If the "jargon and gibberish" of the Hegelian language remained unintelligible to Mr. Hartmann, he would have done better to sound more closely this rugged depth instead of complaining about its unintelligibility after some superficial skipping over the pages. This complaint at least has gone out of fashion long ago, after the rich development of the Hegelian school has unlocked those depths without reducing them to shallowness, as the author at some places imputes humanely in parenthesis to the school (p. 95). If, aside from this, "Hegel's merits in philosophy of rights, æsthetics, philosophy of religion, philosophy of history, and history of philosophy," the whole philosophy indeed, are not to be estimated lightly, I should like very much to know how Hegel managed to accomplish this in spite of his method, which "brought in everywhere obscurity and confusion, made the plain difficult, and removed the dark and problematic farther from its solution" (pp. 119-20). How can merit be possible, as Hegel never made a single step without his method? Or this merit must of necessity be quite exorbitant, superhuman, as he had to overcome the difficulties which his method had prepared for him.

The *resumé* and the end of my critique is therefore: Not "the Hegelian dialectic embraces merely the spectres of its own imagination"; it is not "the dialectic that suffers of morbid excess of irritation" (p. 120). Mr. Hartmann, on the contrary, describes this with his own state of mind, "which can only show a contradiction in those places where it has carried it in" (p. 123). These contradictions have lodged and crammed themselves into such a "head" (p. 121) perhaps for the reason that Mr. Hartmann "has never come into personal contact with a teacher of philosophy," and even a teacher's letters have remained without any influence on him.